The very idea of possible granting the NATO membership for Ukraine is aggravating the situation in security sphere of the region. Moreover, this idea is not supported by majority of Ukrainians. That’s why it sounds reasonable to withdraw question of possible membership of Ukraine in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from the country’s foreign agenda. Such was the main message conveyed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Kostyantyn Hryshchenko at the 11th Interdepartmental Meeting on questions of coordination of the executive power institutions in foreign policy sphere (27 May 2010).
“This idea is destructively influencing the effectiveness of foreign policy of our state, and the security situation in the region”, Mr. Hryshchenko said. Ukraine is going to develop its relationships with the Alliance, but only in frames of mutually beneficial co-operation, he added. But “the question of membership has been withdrawn from agenda”.
Showing posts with label NATO. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NATO. Show all posts
Thursday, May 27, 2010
Thursday, January 29, 2009
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer: "If there is a Russian-Ukrainian dispute on energy security I think NATO allies should pick that up".
Let me not to tell anything about Ukrainian politics today. Everything is going well here in Kiev, the politicians are going on with presidential campaign, claiming each other in all the possible sins. The main topics of discussion: gas contracts (Presidential secretariat has issued a new research, making the conclusion that the papers signed in Moscow are not good for Ukraine and may - and possibly should - be revised), the date of Presidential election (December 2008 or January 2009), and a couple of dismissals and appointments - current and prospective. Instead of Ukrainian domestic politics saga, I propose some NATO-reading for today: Transatlantic Leadership For A New Era: Speech by the NATO Secretary General at the Security and Defence Agenda - 26 January 2009. This speech, followed with questions and answers session, really worth to be read. I will give here the words of NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, which were concerning directly Ukraine and its geopolitical role in global processes.
"We have seen how the need for reliable energy supply is transforming from a mainly economic question into a central security issue. For many nations, being cut off from energy is a matter of national survival. The recent quarrel between Russia and Ukraine was only the latest reminder of this. This latest crisis showed how a bilateral dispute can have a powerful knock-on effect, both in terms of the heat in houses and a chill in international relations".
"Clearly, no one gets a veto over NATO enlargement. That process is central to our aim of consolidating Europe as an undivided and democratic security space and it is not negotiable. The pace and direction will be of our choosing. But the NATO-Russia relationship is too valuable to be stuck in never-changing arguments. We need a positive agenda, one that befits the importance of both Russia and NATO".
"Considering the political, security and energy issues that run through Central Asia and the Caucasus, I believe we need stepped up focus on those regions as well. I think NATO should consider its role in energy security much more seriously. There is, to my mind, clear added value for the Alliance".
"It is simply not enough to have Heads of State and Government provide NATO with a mandate in energy security, yet to have Allies hesitate to use NATO as a forum for discussion during crises".
"The Bucharest decision was rather clear, or was very clear, I should say, and as I said in my introductory remarks, we will set the pace and we will decide upon the moment. But the moment is performance-based. So I cannot give you a timeframe. It is not around the corner, I would say, as we speak, as far as, of course, Ukraine and Georgia are concerned. We are intensifying our relationship, as you know, through the NATO-Ukraine Commission, the NATO-Georgia Commission, but I do think that enlargement in this sense is not around the corner, but I can't be more specific here in that regard".
"If there is a Russian-Ukrainian dispute on energy security I think NATO allies should pick that up. Not because we have any ambition, or we pretend to play any role. Please, no! There was a Czech presidency which immediately was proactive and involved. That was the European Union involved. Other people were involved. Certainly not NATO. But that does not mean that those subjects are irrelevant for NATO, if you agree with me that NATO is a political military organization".
"I think Russia cannot afford to have a non-dialogue with NATO, and NATO cannot afford to have a non-dialogue with Russia".
"Of course I'm discussing protecting pipelines in times of crisis. I said protecting pipelines is first and foremost a national responsibility. And it should stay like that. NATO is not in the business of protecting pipelines. But when there's a crisis, or if a certain nation asks for assistance, NATO could, I think, be instrumental in protecting pipelines on land".
"NATO is not in the energy business. So if in a situation like we had over the past weeks NATO allies are totally deprived of gas you will not see a NATO Secretary General stepping forward, raise his finger and tell the Europeans or the Russians or the Ukrainians for that matter, listen, guys, you have to stop this. We have other international organizations, other people to do this, and certainly not a NATO Secretary General, the European pres... the European Union presidency, rather, or others.
So we are not in the energy business, but of course when a nation is for a long time deprived of all gas, or all energy, in the North Atlantic Council, and quite rightly so, when a nation raises its finger and says, Secretary General, we would like to discuss the energy situation, should NATO then say no, that's none of our business? I don't think so. Although you'll not see us in the forefront in the energy business because we are not in the energy business. We're in the security business.
And I say again, we usually use the word energy security. And that's our business".
"We have seen how the need for reliable energy supply is transforming from a mainly economic question into a central security issue. For many nations, being cut off from energy is a matter of national survival. The recent quarrel between Russia and Ukraine was only the latest reminder of this. This latest crisis showed how a bilateral dispute can have a powerful knock-on effect, both in terms of the heat in houses and a chill in international relations".
"Clearly, no one gets a veto over NATO enlargement. That process is central to our aim of consolidating Europe as an undivided and democratic security space and it is not negotiable. The pace and direction will be of our choosing. But the NATO-Russia relationship is too valuable to be stuck in never-changing arguments. We need a positive agenda, one that befits the importance of both Russia and NATO".
"Considering the political, security and energy issues that run through Central Asia and the Caucasus, I believe we need stepped up focus on those regions as well. I think NATO should consider its role in energy security much more seriously. There is, to my mind, clear added value for the Alliance".
"It is simply not enough to have Heads of State and Government provide NATO with a mandate in energy security, yet to have Allies hesitate to use NATO as a forum for discussion during crises".
"The Bucharest decision was rather clear, or was very clear, I should say, and as I said in my introductory remarks, we will set the pace and we will decide upon the moment. But the moment is performance-based. So I cannot give you a timeframe. It is not around the corner, I would say, as we speak, as far as, of course, Ukraine and Georgia are concerned. We are intensifying our relationship, as you know, through the NATO-Ukraine Commission, the NATO-Georgia Commission, but I do think that enlargement in this sense is not around the corner, but I can't be more specific here in that regard".
"If there is a Russian-Ukrainian dispute on energy security I think NATO allies should pick that up. Not because we have any ambition, or we pretend to play any role. Please, no! There was a Czech presidency which immediately was proactive and involved. That was the European Union involved. Other people were involved. Certainly not NATO. But that does not mean that those subjects are irrelevant for NATO, if you agree with me that NATO is a political military organization".
"I think Russia cannot afford to have a non-dialogue with NATO, and NATO cannot afford to have a non-dialogue with Russia".
"Of course I'm discussing protecting pipelines in times of crisis. I said protecting pipelines is first and foremost a national responsibility. And it should stay like that. NATO is not in the business of protecting pipelines. But when there's a crisis, or if a certain nation asks for assistance, NATO could, I think, be instrumental in protecting pipelines on land".
"NATO is not in the energy business. So if in a situation like we had over the past weeks NATO allies are totally deprived of gas you will not see a NATO Secretary General stepping forward, raise his finger and tell the Europeans or the Russians or the Ukrainians for that matter, listen, guys, you have to stop this. We have other international organizations, other people to do this, and certainly not a NATO Secretary General, the European pres... the European Union presidency, rather, or others.
So we are not in the energy business, but of course when a nation is for a long time deprived of all gas, or all energy, in the North Atlantic Council, and quite rightly so, when a nation raises its finger and says, Secretary General, we would like to discuss the energy situation, should NATO then say no, that's none of our business? I don't think so. Although you'll not see us in the forefront in the energy business because we are not in the energy business. We're in the security business.
And I say again, we usually use the word energy security. And that's our business".
Sunday, January 11, 2009
High Treason – II. Some conclusions from the Cold War started by Russia-Ukraine gas dispute.
The Gas Cold War 2009 caused by the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute has not finished yet, but we can already make some important conclusions. Sitting in the cold Kiev flat (we’ve got very low pressure in central heating system), I will try to give my point of view as briefly as possible.
Conclusion 1. The indisputable winner of the Gas Cold War 2009 is Russia and Russian Gazprom.
I would not agree with some observers who say that the image of Russia as a reliable gas supplier and the Gazprom as a relevant business partner suffered a lot. Europe and Europeans may think and feel whatever they want, but it is really impossible to replace more than 160 billion of cubic meters of Russian gas with some alternative source of energy. So, Europe will stay dependent on Russian gas supply, whatever the image of Russia will be.
Actually Russian Gazprom has already received a lot of profits from the Cold War:
1. Gas prises. European consumers were predicting the Russian gas average prices for Europe to fall to around $320 per tcm (thousand cubic metres) in 2009 due to the low oil prices level. New Cold War led to rise of the oil demand in Europe as of the alternative energy resource, and this will prevent the significant fall of gas prices.
2. Alternative pipeline projects. Gazprom currently has two new gas pipelines projects: the Nord Stream pipeline, which runs under the Baltic sea from Russian Vyborg to German Greifswald, and the South Stream, which will cross the Black Sea to Bulgaria and then split in the direction of Austria and Greece. Both pipelines will definitely get bigger support of the European companies, as the alternative for “non-adequate” Ukrainian route. (Though Ukrainian route cannot be eliminated as it transports around 80% of Russian gas export to Europe).
3. Punching Ukraine. Undermining the image of Ukraine and its President Viktor Yushchenko was a “pleasant revenge” of Russia and its top-authorities for Orange Revolution, support of Georgia, and Holodomor festivities. After this crisis nobody (except of some ultra-pro-Ukrainian-idealists) in Europe would think seriously about the possibility for Ukraine to join the EU earlier than in 100 years, and nobody in NATO would seriously consider future Ukrainian full membership in the Alliance.
4. Extra money. The crises appeared to become the real opportunity to rise gas prices for Ukraine and to get extra-profits.
Conclusion 2. The Gas Cold War was artificially organized.
Of course, Ukraine could sign the gas supply agreement with Russia before the New Year and prevent the crisis. Gazprom proposed the price of $250 per tcm, which is acceptable for Ukraine and its economy (in case of proper management of the State Oli and Gas Company Naftogaz Ukraine and fair distribution of up to 18 billion cubic meters of gas the Ukraine is producing by itself every year. The price of $250 is logical: last year Ukraine was paying $179,5 per tcm, and there is an agreement that the price will raise gradually to the European level during three years. It is approximately plus $70-80-90 every year, so, Russians should charge $250 or even more, and it was predictable.
But the gas agreement with Russia was not signed, and the Ukrainian officials who refused to sign the documents were consciously provoking the gas crisis. No agreement – no supplies, even a schoolboy may predict such a situation. Some Naftogaz officials said that the President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko prohibited signing of this agreement. It sounds unconvincing, as at that time nobody, including the Prime Minister of Ukraine Yulia Tymoshenko, made any rough statement on this point. It is also very naïve to think that the Gazprom and Naftogaz Ukraine really have communication problems and cannot reach a deal on gas supply to Ukraine. It’s unbelievable even if we take to the account the fact that the Head of Naftogaz Oleg Dubyna is flying in one plane with his Gazprom counterpart Aleksei Miller.
So, the gas crisis was surely staged by Kremlin and by some high authorities in Ukraine. Viktor Yushchenko is not among them, though he didn’t do anything (he could do a lot) to prevent the Gas Cold War. I would also add that the Head of Naftogaz Ukraine Oleg Dubyna was appointed to his position by the Yulia Tymoshenko’s quota, and that he is in very close relations with the Industrial Union of Donbass business group, which has permanent conflict of interests with “gas trade middleman” Dmytro Firtash who controls half of the “RosUkrEnergo” intermediate company.
Conclusion 3. In frames of Ukrainian domestic politics the gas crisis played not in favour of President Yushchenko.
Everyone might notice that the President of Ukraine was trying not to be involved into the gas crisis from the very start. He was mentioned a lot by all the participants of the negotiations (in positive and negative manner), he made some phone calls to his counterparts in Europe and to Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev, but he was avoiding to get inside the negotiations and discussions by himself. Why? It seems that he has a very vulnerable position, when one is talking about the gas supply question. During his Presidency, Mr. Yushchenko has been accused a lot of times in having some profits from the work of the RosUkrEnergo. In particular some people were accusing Mr. Firtash in paying some bills for Kateryna Chumachenko, the wife of the President. These accusations were never proved, but also never dishonoured, though Viktor Yushchenko could for example appeal to courts. If these accusations were true (even semi-true), Viktor Yushchenko is going to lose one of the main sources of his financial support before the Presidential election. By the way, some of the money may be re-transferred in favour of Mrs. Tymoshenko, if we just hypothetically assume that the Itera Company of Igor Makarov may come back to the big gas-supply scene as some people say.
Conclusion 4. The main loser of the Cold War is Ukraine as a country, its economy, and the State oil and gas company Naftogaz Ukraine (but not the current management of this company).
In the geopolitical sense the image of Ukraine as a country (and as a democratic country in particular) has suffered a lot. The New Cold War has demonstrated that Ukraine is totally unpredictable, since the actions of its authorities and state companies are based on the today’s interests of domestic politics, rather than on long-term programmes or interests of the country. Despite of the declarations about the dedication to the democratic ideals and the European course of current leaders of Ukraine, they showed up as a real threat to Europe, European economy and even to the health of the citizens of the European States.
The State Oil and Gas Company Naftogaz Ukraine is close to bankruptcy today. Though I am sure that with normal management this company may easily become a mail financial supplier of Ukrainian budget. (I was trying to make some calculations earlier, and maybe will publish the results here one day, of course, after careful self-proof-reading).
Conclusion 5. The intermediate gas supply company RosUkrEnergo may seem to be a loser, but is not.
The intermediate company RosUkrEnergo also may be considered as a loser in the New Cold War as it will probably be eliminated from Russia-Ukraine gas trade scheme. But I don’t think this statement is true, taking to the account billions dollars of profit RosUkrEnergo had received during the last four years, operating in the sphere of the re-export of gas from Russia to Ukraine and Europe (Hungary, Romania, Poland and Slovakia) and gas trade inside the domestic market of Ukraine. Half owned by Gazprom, RosUkrEnergo was founded as a temporary source of profits, and now it’s just a time for something new. I will not be surprised if Mr. Firtash would be among founders of a new gas trade company who will operate on European – and Ukrainian – markets in coming years.
Conclusion 6. The Europe, still suffering from lack of gas supply, may be considered as a loser also, and the object of manipulation as well.
Conclusion 7. The Cold War is an evidence of a betrayal of the interests of Ukraine by its highest authorities – President, Prime Minister, and Head of State Oil and Gas Company. Their actions and failure to act as well may be called as a high treason with all the consequences it should cause.
Conclusion 1. The indisputable winner of the Gas Cold War 2009 is Russia and Russian Gazprom.
I would not agree with some observers who say that the image of Russia as a reliable gas supplier and the Gazprom as a relevant business partner suffered a lot. Europe and Europeans may think and feel whatever they want, but it is really impossible to replace more than 160 billion of cubic meters of Russian gas with some alternative source of energy. So, Europe will stay dependent on Russian gas supply, whatever the image of Russia will be.
Actually Russian Gazprom has already received a lot of profits from the Cold War:
1. Gas prises. European consumers were predicting the Russian gas average prices for Europe to fall to around $320 per tcm (thousand cubic metres) in 2009 due to the low oil prices level. New Cold War led to rise of the oil demand in Europe as of the alternative energy resource, and this will prevent the significant fall of gas prices.
2. Alternative pipeline projects. Gazprom currently has two new gas pipelines projects: the Nord Stream pipeline, which runs under the Baltic sea from Russian Vyborg to German Greifswald, and the South Stream, which will cross the Black Sea to Bulgaria and then split in the direction of Austria and Greece. Both pipelines will definitely get bigger support of the European companies, as the alternative for “non-adequate” Ukrainian route. (Though Ukrainian route cannot be eliminated as it transports around 80% of Russian gas export to Europe).
3. Punching Ukraine. Undermining the image of Ukraine and its President Viktor Yushchenko was a “pleasant revenge” of Russia and its top-authorities for Orange Revolution, support of Georgia, and Holodomor festivities. After this crisis nobody (except of some ultra-pro-Ukrainian-idealists) in Europe would think seriously about the possibility for Ukraine to join the EU earlier than in 100 years, and nobody in NATO would seriously consider future Ukrainian full membership in the Alliance.
4. Extra money. The crises appeared to become the real opportunity to rise gas prices for Ukraine and to get extra-profits.
Conclusion 2. The Gas Cold War was artificially organized.
Of course, Ukraine could sign the gas supply agreement with Russia before the New Year and prevent the crisis. Gazprom proposed the price of $250 per tcm, which is acceptable for Ukraine and its economy (in case of proper management of the State Oli and Gas Company Naftogaz Ukraine and fair distribution of up to 18 billion cubic meters of gas the Ukraine is producing by itself every year. The price of $250 is logical: last year Ukraine was paying $179,5 per tcm, and there is an agreement that the price will raise gradually to the European level during three years. It is approximately plus $70-80-90 every year, so, Russians should charge $250 or even more, and it was predictable.
But the gas agreement with Russia was not signed, and the Ukrainian officials who refused to sign the documents were consciously provoking the gas crisis. No agreement – no supplies, even a schoolboy may predict such a situation. Some Naftogaz officials said that the President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko prohibited signing of this agreement. It sounds unconvincing, as at that time nobody, including the Prime Minister of Ukraine Yulia Tymoshenko, made any rough statement on this point. It is also very naïve to think that the Gazprom and Naftogaz Ukraine really have communication problems and cannot reach a deal on gas supply to Ukraine. It’s unbelievable even if we take to the account the fact that the Head of Naftogaz Oleg Dubyna is flying in one plane with his Gazprom counterpart Aleksei Miller.
So, the gas crisis was surely staged by Kremlin and by some high authorities in Ukraine. Viktor Yushchenko is not among them, though he didn’t do anything (he could do a lot) to prevent the Gas Cold War. I would also add that the Head of Naftogaz Ukraine Oleg Dubyna was appointed to his position by the Yulia Tymoshenko’s quota, and that he is in very close relations with the Industrial Union of Donbass business group, which has permanent conflict of interests with “gas trade middleman” Dmytro Firtash who controls half of the “RosUkrEnergo” intermediate company.
Conclusion 3. In frames of Ukrainian domestic politics the gas crisis played not in favour of President Yushchenko.
Everyone might notice that the President of Ukraine was trying not to be involved into the gas crisis from the very start. He was mentioned a lot by all the participants of the negotiations (in positive and negative manner), he made some phone calls to his counterparts in Europe and to Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev, but he was avoiding to get inside the negotiations and discussions by himself. Why? It seems that he has a very vulnerable position, when one is talking about the gas supply question. During his Presidency, Mr. Yushchenko has been accused a lot of times in having some profits from the work of the RosUkrEnergo. In particular some people were accusing Mr. Firtash in paying some bills for Kateryna Chumachenko, the wife of the President. These accusations were never proved, but also never dishonoured, though Viktor Yushchenko could for example appeal to courts. If these accusations were true (even semi-true), Viktor Yushchenko is going to lose one of the main sources of his financial support before the Presidential election. By the way, some of the money may be re-transferred in favour of Mrs. Tymoshenko, if we just hypothetically assume that the Itera Company of Igor Makarov may come back to the big gas-supply scene as some people say.
Conclusion 4. The main loser of the Cold War is Ukraine as a country, its economy, and the State oil and gas company Naftogaz Ukraine (but not the current management of this company).
In the geopolitical sense the image of Ukraine as a country (and as a democratic country in particular) has suffered a lot. The New Cold War has demonstrated that Ukraine is totally unpredictable, since the actions of its authorities and state companies are based on the today’s interests of domestic politics, rather than on long-term programmes or interests of the country. Despite of the declarations about the dedication to the democratic ideals and the European course of current leaders of Ukraine, they showed up as a real threat to Europe, European economy and even to the health of the citizens of the European States.
The State Oil and Gas Company Naftogaz Ukraine is close to bankruptcy today. Though I am sure that with normal management this company may easily become a mail financial supplier of Ukrainian budget. (I was trying to make some calculations earlier, and maybe will publish the results here one day, of course, after careful self-proof-reading).
Conclusion 5. The intermediate gas supply company RosUkrEnergo may seem to be a loser, but is not.
The intermediate company RosUkrEnergo also may be considered as a loser in the New Cold War as it will probably be eliminated from Russia-Ukraine gas trade scheme. But I don’t think this statement is true, taking to the account billions dollars of profit RosUkrEnergo had received during the last four years, operating in the sphere of the re-export of gas from Russia to Ukraine and Europe (Hungary, Romania, Poland and Slovakia) and gas trade inside the domestic market of Ukraine. Half owned by Gazprom, RosUkrEnergo was founded as a temporary source of profits, and now it’s just a time for something new. I will not be surprised if Mr. Firtash would be among founders of a new gas trade company who will operate on European – and Ukrainian – markets in coming years.
Conclusion 6. The Europe, still suffering from lack of gas supply, may be considered as a loser also, and the object of manipulation as well.
Conclusion 7. The Cold War is an evidence of a betrayal of the interests of Ukraine by its highest authorities – President, Prime Minister, and Head of State Oil and Gas Company. Their actions and failure to act as well may be called as a high treason with all the consequences it should cause.
Monday, December 22, 2008
What’s up, Ukraine? 15-21 December 2008.
Falling currency . On Thursday, 18 December the Ukrainian hryvnia dropped to its historical low against the US dollar – 10-10.5.
Less than a half of the year ago US dollar cost around 4.8 hryvnias. The Prime Minister of Ukraine Yulia Tymoshenko declared that the hryvnia’s value felt down due to “a special speculative operations planned at the currency market of Ukraine, and organized with the assistance of the National Bank (Central bank) and some other banks of Ukraine”, in particular, Nadra bank.
“The bank that was just bought for 600 million dollars, received from the National Bank financial resources of 7 billion 100 million hryvnias”, Yulia Tymoshenko said, adding that “the bribes made up from 3% to 7% of the total amount of financing”. Yulia Tymoshenko pointed out that Ukrainian businessman Dmytro Firtash (owner of the Group DF holding, which is famous also for a scandal around the financial support of the British Conservatives) and the Presidential Secretariat are standing behind the Nadra bank. “They need to tumble the hryvnia’s value to dollar”.
Getting closer. The U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Volodymyr Ohryzko signed the U.S. – Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership.
The joint U.S. – Ukrainian declaration called a “Charter on Strategic Partnership”, signed in Washington on 19 December, appeals for the expanding of the economic and security ties between two countries, and strengthening of the cooperation in energy, trade and other areas.The document does not have a legally binding status.
The declaration states that the United States intends to open a diplomatic post in the Autonomy Republic of Crimea, a region that is highly influenced by Russia (there are many ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking people with Russian passports), and is hosting Russia's Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol (under a lease agreement until 2017). ”Ukraine welcomes the United States' intention to establish an American diplomatic presence (American presence post) in Simferopol, the capital of Crimea”, said the joint declaration.
State Department spokesman Sean McCormack has already said the Crimean diplomatic post would be a small one, dedicated to the organising of cultural events and doing political reporting. Mr. McCormack denied any intentions to provoke Russia by establishment of this post. ”This is about U.S.-Ukraine bilateral relations. If the Russian government chooses to be upset by ... my stating that we're considering opening up… a one-person or two-person American presence post, well, there's not much I can do about that,” he added. Russian officials haven’t made any statements on this point, but analysts are saying that this answer may be given in more sharp position of Moscow in gas-trade dialogue with Ukraine. Minister Ohryzko told reporters the post “probably will be done next year”.
Also Washington promised to help to strengthen the candidacy of Ukraine for NATO membership, which is another painful question for the official Russia. Nevertheless, U.S. would work within the NATO-Ukraine Commission to agree on a plan for training and equipping Ukrainian armed forces. “We plan to undertake a program of enhanced security cooperation intended to increase Ukrainian capabilities and to strengthen Ukraine's candidacy for NATO membership,” the document said.
Washington also promised to help Ukraine with “rehabilitating and modernizing the capacity of Ukraine's gas transit infrastructure”, cooling down Russian dreams to fort a consortium for the exploiting of Ukrainian gas lines.
Fitch Ratings: The credit outlook for the Ukrainian energy and utility sector during 2009 is negative.
The report issued on Thursday 18 December lists the main problems of the Ukrainian energy and utility sector: a funding crisis in the state-controlled power generation sector, downward pressure on regulated tariffs due to a severe recession, restricted access to bank lending and debt capital markets, and continued turmoil at NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine (‘B’/Rating Watch Negative). Fitch expects an economic recession in Ukraine in 2009 to drive down power demand, providing only temporary respite to falling capacity reserve margins.
Fitch expects liquidity and refinancing risk to remain high for the Ukrainian energy and utility sector through most of 2009, as foreign banks and markets remain effectively closed to Ukrainian issuers. Naftogaz will continue to confront major challenges in 2009, including a lack of transparency, potentially insufficient state subsidisation for its loss-making residential business, higher import prices, accumulating gas payables and restricted access to external financing. However, Fitch continues to view Naftogaz as an important strategic asset for the Ukrainian government (Ukraine rated at ‘B+’/Outlook Negative) and factors state support into the company’s rating.
The 2009 credit outlook, entitled "Ukrainian Energy and Utilities – 2009 Outlook”, is available on the agency's public website http://www.fitchratings.com/.
Eternal problem. Russia blocks Ukrainian famine-genocide resolution at the United Nations.
Russia blocked Ukraine-initiated UN resolution claiming Holodomor in the Soviet Union in early 1930s was famine-genocide aimed against Ukrainians, rather than a common tragedy of many nations in the country. “We succeeded to bloc the inclusion of the item into the agenda of the current UN General Assembly,” Russian Ambassador to the United Nations Vitaly Churkin said on Thursday, 18 December, according to the Russian media.
The Ambassador also added the United States and Great Britain backed the Ukrainian motion, which “ended in nothing.” Mr. Churkin said Russian representatives were active in explaining the history of Holodomor to foreign partners. As a result, nine EU countries did not sign the Ukrainian declaration, although “EU members usually act in a consolidated manner”.
Less than a half of the year ago US dollar cost around 4.8 hryvnias. The Prime Minister of Ukraine Yulia Tymoshenko declared that the hryvnia’s value felt down due to “a special speculative operations planned at the currency market of Ukraine, and organized with the assistance of the National Bank (Central bank) and some other banks of Ukraine”, in particular, Nadra bank.
“The bank that was just bought for 600 million dollars, received from the National Bank financial resources of 7 billion 100 million hryvnias”, Yulia Tymoshenko said, adding that “the bribes made up from 3% to 7% of the total amount of financing”. Yulia Tymoshenko pointed out that Ukrainian businessman Dmytro Firtash (owner of the Group DF holding, which is famous also for a scandal around the financial support of the British Conservatives) and the Presidential Secretariat are standing behind the Nadra bank. “They need to tumble the hryvnia’s value to dollar”.
Getting closer. The U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Volodymyr Ohryzko signed the U.S. – Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership.
The joint U.S. – Ukrainian declaration called a “Charter on Strategic Partnership”, signed in Washington on 19 December, appeals for the expanding of the economic and security ties between two countries, and strengthening of the cooperation in energy, trade and other areas.The document does not have a legally binding status.
The declaration states that the United States intends to open a diplomatic post in the Autonomy Republic of Crimea, a region that is highly influenced by Russia (there are many ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking people with Russian passports), and is hosting Russia's Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol (under a lease agreement until 2017). ”Ukraine welcomes the United States' intention to establish an American diplomatic presence (American presence post) in Simferopol, the capital of Crimea”, said the joint declaration.
State Department spokesman Sean McCormack has already said the Crimean diplomatic post would be a small one, dedicated to the organising of cultural events and doing political reporting. Mr. McCormack denied any intentions to provoke Russia by establishment of this post. ”This is about U.S.-Ukraine bilateral relations. If the Russian government chooses to be upset by ... my stating that we're considering opening up… a one-person or two-person American presence post, well, there's not much I can do about that,” he added. Russian officials haven’t made any statements on this point, but analysts are saying that this answer may be given in more sharp position of Moscow in gas-trade dialogue with Ukraine. Minister Ohryzko told reporters the post “probably will be done next year”.
Also Washington promised to help to strengthen the candidacy of Ukraine for NATO membership, which is another painful question for the official Russia. Nevertheless, U.S. would work within the NATO-Ukraine Commission to agree on a plan for training and equipping Ukrainian armed forces. “We plan to undertake a program of enhanced security cooperation intended to increase Ukrainian capabilities and to strengthen Ukraine's candidacy for NATO membership,” the document said.
Washington also promised to help Ukraine with “rehabilitating and modernizing the capacity of Ukraine's gas transit infrastructure”, cooling down Russian dreams to fort a consortium for the exploiting of Ukrainian gas lines.
Fitch Ratings: The credit outlook for the Ukrainian energy and utility sector during 2009 is negative.
The report issued on Thursday 18 December lists the main problems of the Ukrainian energy and utility sector: a funding crisis in the state-controlled power generation sector, downward pressure on regulated tariffs due to a severe recession, restricted access to bank lending and debt capital markets, and continued turmoil at NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine (‘B’/Rating Watch Negative). Fitch expects an economic recession in Ukraine in 2009 to drive down power demand, providing only temporary respite to falling capacity reserve margins.
Fitch expects liquidity and refinancing risk to remain high for the Ukrainian energy and utility sector through most of 2009, as foreign banks and markets remain effectively closed to Ukrainian issuers. Naftogaz will continue to confront major challenges in 2009, including a lack of transparency, potentially insufficient state subsidisation for its loss-making residential business, higher import prices, accumulating gas payables and restricted access to external financing. However, Fitch continues to view Naftogaz as an important strategic asset for the Ukrainian government (Ukraine rated at ‘B+’/Outlook Negative) and factors state support into the company’s rating.
The 2009 credit outlook, entitled "Ukrainian Energy and Utilities – 2009 Outlook”, is available on the agency's public website http://www.fitchratings.com/.
Eternal problem. Russia blocks Ukrainian famine-genocide resolution at the United Nations.
Russia blocked Ukraine-initiated UN resolution claiming Holodomor in the Soviet Union in early 1930s was famine-genocide aimed against Ukrainians, rather than a common tragedy of many nations in the country. “We succeeded to bloc the inclusion of the item into the agenda of the current UN General Assembly,” Russian Ambassador to the United Nations Vitaly Churkin said on Thursday, 18 December, according to the Russian media.
The Ambassador also added the United States and Great Britain backed the Ukrainian motion, which “ended in nothing.” Mr. Churkin said Russian representatives were active in explaining the history of Holodomor to foreign partners. As a result, nine EU countries did not sign the Ukrainian declaration, although “EU members usually act in a consolidated manner”.
Sunday, November 30, 2008
Ukraine will be a NATO member. Letter of the President of Ukraine published by the International Herald Tribune.
Viktor Yushchenko's letter will be printed tomorrow, but may be read online now: We're ready if you are - International Herald Tribune.
And one more link to the article appeared in print in the New York Times today - Claims of Secret Arms Sales Rattle Ukraine’s Leaders - NYTimes.com.
And one more link to the article appeared in print in the New York Times today - Claims of Secret Arms Sales Rattle Ukraine’s Leaders - NYTimes.com.
Tuesday, November 18, 2008
What's up, Ukraine? (8-14 November 2008)
1. The Headless Parliament. Arseniy Yatseniuk is dismissed from the post of Head of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.
My point of view on a situation you may read in one of my previous posts here.
2. President announces the government change. The results of 4th Baku Energy Summit.
On 13-14 November the President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko visited Azerbaijan to take part in 4th Energy Summit. Unfortunately, the main news from the Summit for Ukraine can not be put in frames of energy issues.
In his interview to journalists Yushchenko said that switching of the Odesa-Brody pipeline to avers (forward) mode has been blockading because of political motives. He expressed opinion that such attitude is explained by “political promises and obligations” of the Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. “The consultations, the Prime Minister had before September in certain capitals and the decisions, the government made after that… blocked transportation of Caspian oil”, the President said.
Viktor Yushchenko also mentioned that “starting from the end of the first half of the 2009, we will be supplied with amounts of oil needed to start the avers mode. I am assured that that time we will have a new Government, which will be able to realise a healthy politics that corresponds to the national interests”.
3. NATO: yes, but not today. On 13 November 2008 the Minister of Defence of Ukraine Yuriy Yekhanurov took part in the high-level NATO-Ukraine meeting in Tallinn, capital of Estonia.
The main conclusion of the Summit: Ukraine has a lot to do before it will be ready to become member of the NATO. Ukraine was hoping to join the bloc’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the NATO Summit in December with the US support. But other influential members of NATO (like Germany and France) are thinking that to start the MAP with Russia’s neighbour is not a good idea as for today.
“Let me remind you that at the Bucharest Summit earlier this year, NATO heads of state and government welcomed Ukraine Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO and agreed that Ukraine will become a member of the alliance,” stressed NATO secretary general de Hoop Scheffer. US Defense Secretary Robert Gates also emphasiced his country’s support for Georgian and Ukrainian membership. Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves said that “the fact that Ukraine is here today with NATO ministers of defence should convince everyone that NATO understands Ukraine's importance to European security… We should consider how to move beyond the current deadlock over timelines and political symbols.”
So, everyone is thinking positively. It means that Ukraine will become member of NATO in future. May I remind that the EU leaders also promised that Turkey will become member of the European Union. The question is about time-frames. Ukrainian NATO membership bid is really very complicated by internal political crisis and – what is more important – a lack of public support. It seems to me, we do have time to change the situation for better.
4. Holodomor: Distorted History. On 17 November the President of Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev wrote a letter to the President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko.
I’ll just give English translation of the most interesting parts of this letter. No comments:
“In response to your messages concerning the so-called Holodomor as well as the steps taken by the Ukrainian leadership on the issue, I consider it necessary to elaborate on our views of and approaches to the issues at hand. We clearly see that in recent years this topic combined with persistent attempts to receive a NATO «membership action plan», have become a central element of Ukrainian foreign policy.
In our opinion, the tragic events of the early 1930s in Ukraine are being used to achieve immediate short-term political goals.
The famine in the Soviet Union in 1932-1933 was not aimed at the destruction of any one nation. It was the result of a drought, forced collectivization and de-kulakization [campaign of political repressions of the better-off peasants and their families] and affected the entire country, not only Ukraine. Millions of people in the middle and lower Volga regions, northern Caucasus, central Russia, southern Urals, western Siberia, Kazakhstan and Belarus died.
I do not consider it possible to participate in the activities surrounding the 75th anniversary of the «Holodomor» in Ukraine”.
Full text of this letter (translated to English) you may read on the official website of the President of Russia here.
5. Yulia Tymoshenko met George Soros.
As Ukrainian media have informed, on 8 November Prime Minister of Ukraine Yulia Tymoshenko met with famous billionaire George Soros. The meeting took place in Kiev, but not in a center, but in a restaurant near Boryspil airport. Ukrainska Pravda informs that the meeting was confidential, and a role of the interpreter performed the Vice-Prime Minister of Ukraine Hryhoriy Nemyria (who previously worked as a head of Soros Foundation's institution in Ukraine). One of the main reasons of a meeting is future presidential election in Ukraine, journalists think.
President Victor Yushchenko is also tapping the same door. On 14 November we held a phone conversation with the newly elected President of the USA Barack Obama (George Soros was among his financial donors). Victor Yushchenko and Barack Obama agreed to hold a bilateral meeting shortly after the inauguration ceremony of the new President of the USA.
My point of view on a situation you may read in one of my previous posts here.
2. President announces the government change. The results of 4th Baku Energy Summit.
On 13-14 November the President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko visited Azerbaijan to take part in 4th Energy Summit. Unfortunately, the main news from the Summit for Ukraine can not be put in frames of energy issues.
In his interview to journalists Yushchenko said that switching of the Odesa-Brody pipeline to avers (forward) mode has been blockading because of political motives. He expressed opinion that such attitude is explained by “political promises and obligations” of the Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. “The consultations, the Prime Minister had before September in certain capitals and the decisions, the government made after that… blocked transportation of Caspian oil”, the President said.
Viktor Yushchenko also mentioned that “starting from the end of the first half of the 2009, we will be supplied with amounts of oil needed to start the avers mode. I am assured that that time we will have a new Government, which will be able to realise a healthy politics that corresponds to the national interests”.
3. NATO: yes, but not today. On 13 November 2008 the Minister of Defence of Ukraine Yuriy Yekhanurov took part in the high-level NATO-Ukraine meeting in Tallinn, capital of Estonia.
The main conclusion of the Summit: Ukraine has a lot to do before it will be ready to become member of the NATO. Ukraine was hoping to join the bloc’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the NATO Summit in December with the US support. But other influential members of NATO (like Germany and France) are thinking that to start the MAP with Russia’s neighbour is not a good idea as for today.
“Let me remind you that at the Bucharest Summit earlier this year, NATO heads of state and government welcomed Ukraine Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO and agreed that Ukraine will become a member of the alliance,” stressed NATO secretary general de Hoop Scheffer. US Defense Secretary Robert Gates also emphasiced his country’s support for Georgian and Ukrainian membership. Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves said that “the fact that Ukraine is here today with NATO ministers of defence should convince everyone that NATO understands Ukraine's importance to European security… We should consider how to move beyond the current deadlock over timelines and political symbols.”
So, everyone is thinking positively. It means that Ukraine will become member of NATO in future. May I remind that the EU leaders also promised that Turkey will become member of the European Union. The question is about time-frames. Ukrainian NATO membership bid is really very complicated by internal political crisis and – what is more important – a lack of public support. It seems to me, we do have time to change the situation for better.
4. Holodomor: Distorted History. On 17 November the President of Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev wrote a letter to the President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko.
I’ll just give English translation of the most interesting parts of this letter. No comments:
“In response to your messages concerning the so-called Holodomor as well as the steps taken by the Ukrainian leadership on the issue, I consider it necessary to elaborate on our views of and approaches to the issues at hand. We clearly see that in recent years this topic combined with persistent attempts to receive a NATO «membership action plan», have become a central element of Ukrainian foreign policy.
In our opinion, the tragic events of the early 1930s in Ukraine are being used to achieve immediate short-term political goals.
The famine in the Soviet Union in 1932-1933 was not aimed at the destruction of any one nation. It was the result of a drought, forced collectivization and de-kulakization [campaign of political repressions of the better-off peasants and their families] and affected the entire country, not only Ukraine. Millions of people in the middle and lower Volga regions, northern Caucasus, central Russia, southern Urals, western Siberia, Kazakhstan and Belarus died.
I do not consider it possible to participate in the activities surrounding the 75th anniversary of the «Holodomor» in Ukraine”.
Full text of this letter (translated to English) you may read on the official website of the President of Russia here.
5. Yulia Tymoshenko met George Soros.
As Ukrainian media have informed, on 8 November Prime Minister of Ukraine Yulia Tymoshenko met with famous billionaire George Soros. The meeting took place in Kiev, but not in a center, but in a restaurant near Boryspil airport. Ukrainska Pravda informs that the meeting was confidential, and a role of the interpreter performed the Vice-Prime Minister of Ukraine Hryhoriy Nemyria (who previously worked as a head of Soros Foundation's institution in Ukraine). One of the main reasons of a meeting is future presidential election in Ukraine, journalists think.
President Victor Yushchenko is also tapping the same door. On 14 November we held a phone conversation with the newly elected President of the USA Barack Obama (George Soros was among his financial donors). Victor Yushchenko and Barack Obama agreed to hold a bilateral meeting shortly after the inauguration ceremony of the new President of the USA.
Friday, October 17, 2008
The voice of America
Today I've read very interesting interview with Brookings Institute Visiting Fellow and former US Ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer. The interview was conducted by VOA’s Ukrainian Service a few hours before President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko dissolved parliament last week.
On Ukraine’s Chances for a NATO Membership Action Plan in December
“It seems to me that the chances for Ukraine getting a Membership Action Plan in December are practically zero. And actually that’s really because of a couple of reasons. One is, for countries like Germany, obviously, there is the Russian reaction. But the other question, and this goes back to April and the Bucharest summit, is – does the government, does the prime minister support the president’s policy on the Membership Action Plan. So right now there seem to be three scenarios, the most likely of which appears to be new elections. If there are new elections in December or January and when NATO foreign ministers meet in December, they won’t know who the next prime minister is going to be, let alone whether he or she will support a Membership Action Plan. And the other two scenarios would be either an alignment between Regions and the Tymoshenko Bloc or a reconstitution of the Orange coalition between Our Ukraine and the Tymoshenko Bloc in the next couple of days, but both of those scenarios would be very unlikely. It would seem to me that the Regions-Tymoshenko alignment is not going to produce a government that supports a Membership Action Plan. And even if you put back the Orange Coalition, after the problems and the debates between them and the infighting of the last couple of months, I’m not sure European governments are going to see that as sustainable. The other factor seems to me the U.S. government will continue to want to support Ukraine for a Membership Action Plan, but the problem is that in December it’s going to be the final days of the Bush Administration. That administration is just not going to have the diplomatic clout to make a MAP happen.”
More on the President Yushchenko’s Visit to Washington, DC
“Well, I think there are a couple of things here. I mean, you know, first of all, something was different in September from in July, and that is you had the conflict between Russia and Georgia. I’m not sure that represents a threat to Ukraine, but certainly this more assertive Russian foreign policy is a challenge for Ukraine. So it seems to me that a big part of that visit, having President Yushchenko meet with President Bush in the Oval Office, was basically to reaffirm U.S. support, to try to be bolstering of Ukraine. Because there are questions, given what happened in Georgia, does this now mean that Russia is going to behave in a different way towards Ukraine?”
On Whether President Yushchenko was looking for US Support in Ukraine’s Internal Political Squabbles
“I’m not sure. That’s a question you really have to ask President Yushchenko. But I think he probably understands, I mean, American policy’s been pretty consistent on this question. And even Secretary of Defense Gates made the point, I think, even today, is that, you know, deciding who will be the next prime minister for Ukraine, that’s a decision for Ukrainians. The U.S. government’s point of view, as far as I understand it, is we will work with whatever government is in Ukraine. I mean that’s for Ukrainians to decide, whether it’s a government headed by Tymoshenko or somebody else. My sense, though, is that, in talking with some people in the U.S. government, that if they had their choice, they would have liked to see the government continue, as opposed to new elections. And the problem here is, because the sense is that time is being lost and the opportunities are being lost, and the focus in Kiev seems to be on politics, rather than actually governing the country. And here is the scenario that I think worries some people if you want to see Ukraine move forward. If there are elections now, if those elections are held in, say, in December or January, it’s hard to get something done in terms of serious policy during elections. It’s hard in Ukraine. Certainly it’s hard here in the United States right now when we’re just a month out from our elections. But then, based on what we saw in 2006 or 2007, after the election it may take two or three months for Ukraine to form a coalition in the Rada and choose a prime minister. So that takes you maybe to April or early May. At that point you’re only six or seven months from the presidential elections, so everyone focuses on the presidential election. So the concern here is that – it’s my concern, but I also think it’s shared by some in the U.S. government – is that, you know, politics could dominate the next year and a half in Ukraine and it makes it hard for Ukraine to do things in terms of policies that Ukraine needs to push.
On Whether Early Election Will Have a Weakening Effect on Ukraine
“I’ll give you two answers to that. The first answer is -- there’s a lot of confidence, at least I have, that however the politics play out, it’s going to be democratic. I mean it seems all the major political forces -- Yushchenko, Tymoshenko, Yanukovych – understand that you’ve got to play by democratic rules and the Constitution. And that’s a good thing. It means Ukraine, fundamentally, is going to have democratic stability. The other side of the answer, though, is again that while you have the political debate going on, you’re not getting things accomplished, you’re not pursuing policies. I think, again, because I’m a little bit concerned, I wouldn’t call it a threat to Ukraine, but there’s a challenge -- in Moscow. And the question in my mind is – given this more assertive Russian foreign policy that you’re seeing now – is this a time for the Ukrainian leadership to be divided? You know, I think this would be the time really where it would make more sense to come together. Likewise, there are opportunities, the Membership Action Plan, that I think are going to be lost because the political infighting in Ukraine creates a situation where Germany and some of those countries that don’t support a Membership Action Plan could say, well, it’s not just about the Russian concern, it’s about we don’t have confidence in the sustainability of the political line within Kiev.”
On the Stance of John McCain’s and Barack Obama’s Campaigns on Ukraine
“My sense is that when you look at what both campaigns have said, what both candidates have said, I think – and this reflects the fact that support for Ukraine going back to 1993-1994 has really been a bi-partisan issue. I mean both sides support it. And certainly there’s not much difference when you look at what Senator McCain has said and what Senator Obama has said. They both support strong relations with Ukraine. They both support a Membership Action Plan. So, I think they differ on some questions, but I don’t think Ukraine is one of them.”
On Whether John McCain Can Be Perceived As Tougher on Russia
“It may be. But I think in both campaigns there is concern about Russia, I mean, certainly what we saw in August changed the assessment in Washington, and I think elsewhere in Europe about the rules that the Russians are prepared to play by. And it’s caused a greater degree of concern.”
On How the Russia-Georgia Conflict Impacts the Prospect of a NATO Membership Action Plan for Georgia and Ukraine
“I still think that ultimately a Membership Action Plan makes sense for Georgia and Ukraine. But you’re going to have to look at it in the current political realities. And at this point, when you’re looking at December, again, because of the position of some of the European states, because, I think, of the inability of the Bush administration in literally its last days to persuade the Europeans, given concerns about Russia, but also given the questions about what is going on within Ukraine, it just doesn’t seem it’s going to happen.”
On Ukraine’s Chances for a NATO Membership Action Plan in December
“It seems to me that the chances for Ukraine getting a Membership Action Plan in December are practically zero. And actually that’s really because of a couple of reasons. One is, for countries like Germany, obviously, there is the Russian reaction. But the other question, and this goes back to April and the Bucharest summit, is – does the government, does the prime minister support the president’s policy on the Membership Action Plan. So right now there seem to be three scenarios, the most likely of which appears to be new elections. If there are new elections in December or January and when NATO foreign ministers meet in December, they won’t know who the next prime minister is going to be, let alone whether he or she will support a Membership Action Plan. And the other two scenarios would be either an alignment between Regions and the Tymoshenko Bloc or a reconstitution of the Orange coalition between Our Ukraine and the Tymoshenko Bloc in the next couple of days, but both of those scenarios would be very unlikely. It would seem to me that the Regions-Tymoshenko alignment is not going to produce a government that supports a Membership Action Plan. And even if you put back the Orange Coalition, after the problems and the debates between them and the infighting of the last couple of months, I’m not sure European governments are going to see that as sustainable. The other factor seems to me the U.S. government will continue to want to support Ukraine for a Membership Action Plan, but the problem is that in December it’s going to be the final days of the Bush Administration. That administration is just not going to have the diplomatic clout to make a MAP happen.”
More on the President Yushchenko’s Visit to Washington, DC
“Well, I think there are a couple of things here. I mean, you know, first of all, something was different in September from in July, and that is you had the conflict between Russia and Georgia. I’m not sure that represents a threat to Ukraine, but certainly this more assertive Russian foreign policy is a challenge for Ukraine. So it seems to me that a big part of that visit, having President Yushchenko meet with President Bush in the Oval Office, was basically to reaffirm U.S. support, to try to be bolstering of Ukraine. Because there are questions, given what happened in Georgia, does this now mean that Russia is going to behave in a different way towards Ukraine?”
On Whether President Yushchenko was looking for US Support in Ukraine’s Internal Political Squabbles
“I’m not sure. That’s a question you really have to ask President Yushchenko. But I think he probably understands, I mean, American policy’s been pretty consistent on this question. And even Secretary of Defense Gates made the point, I think, even today, is that, you know, deciding who will be the next prime minister for Ukraine, that’s a decision for Ukrainians. The U.S. government’s point of view, as far as I understand it, is we will work with whatever government is in Ukraine. I mean that’s for Ukrainians to decide, whether it’s a government headed by Tymoshenko or somebody else. My sense, though, is that, in talking with some people in the U.S. government, that if they had their choice, they would have liked to see the government continue, as opposed to new elections. And the problem here is, because the sense is that time is being lost and the opportunities are being lost, and the focus in Kiev seems to be on politics, rather than actually governing the country. And here is the scenario that I think worries some people if you want to see Ukraine move forward. If there are elections now, if those elections are held in, say, in December or January, it’s hard to get something done in terms of serious policy during elections. It’s hard in Ukraine. Certainly it’s hard here in the United States right now when we’re just a month out from our elections. But then, based on what we saw in 2006 or 2007, after the election it may take two or three months for Ukraine to form a coalition in the Rada and choose a prime minister. So that takes you maybe to April or early May. At that point you’re only six or seven months from the presidential elections, so everyone focuses on the presidential election. So the concern here is that – it’s my concern, but I also think it’s shared by some in the U.S. government – is that, you know, politics could dominate the next year and a half in Ukraine and it makes it hard for Ukraine to do things in terms of policies that Ukraine needs to push.
On Whether Early Election Will Have a Weakening Effect on Ukraine
“I’ll give you two answers to that. The first answer is -- there’s a lot of confidence, at least I have, that however the politics play out, it’s going to be democratic. I mean it seems all the major political forces -- Yushchenko, Tymoshenko, Yanukovych – understand that you’ve got to play by democratic rules and the Constitution. And that’s a good thing. It means Ukraine, fundamentally, is going to have democratic stability. The other side of the answer, though, is again that while you have the political debate going on, you’re not getting things accomplished, you’re not pursuing policies. I think, again, because I’m a little bit concerned, I wouldn’t call it a threat to Ukraine, but there’s a challenge -- in Moscow. And the question in my mind is – given this more assertive Russian foreign policy that you’re seeing now – is this a time for the Ukrainian leadership to be divided? You know, I think this would be the time really where it would make more sense to come together. Likewise, there are opportunities, the Membership Action Plan, that I think are going to be lost because the political infighting in Ukraine creates a situation where Germany and some of those countries that don’t support a Membership Action Plan could say, well, it’s not just about the Russian concern, it’s about we don’t have confidence in the sustainability of the political line within Kiev.”
On the Stance of John McCain’s and Barack Obama’s Campaigns on Ukraine
“My sense is that when you look at what both campaigns have said, what both candidates have said, I think – and this reflects the fact that support for Ukraine going back to 1993-1994 has really been a bi-partisan issue. I mean both sides support it. And certainly there’s not much difference when you look at what Senator McCain has said and what Senator Obama has said. They both support strong relations with Ukraine. They both support a Membership Action Plan. So, I think they differ on some questions, but I don’t think Ukraine is one of them.”
On Whether John McCain Can Be Perceived As Tougher on Russia
“It may be. But I think in both campaigns there is concern about Russia, I mean, certainly what we saw in August changed the assessment in Washington, and I think elsewhere in Europe about the rules that the Russians are prepared to play by. And it’s caused a greater degree of concern.”
On How the Russia-Georgia Conflict Impacts the Prospect of a NATO Membership Action Plan for Georgia and Ukraine
“I still think that ultimately a Membership Action Plan makes sense for Georgia and Ukraine. But you’re going to have to look at it in the current political realities. And at this point, when you’re looking at December, again, because of the position of some of the European states, because, I think, of the inability of the Bush administration in literally its last days to persuade the Europeans, given concerns about Russia, but also given the questions about what is going on within Ukraine, it just doesn’t seem it’s going to happen.”
Tuesday, July 22, 2008
Terry Davis: Instead of talking about early elections, Ukrainian politicians should concentrate on promises they made
This interview will be published in Ukrainian "Narodny Deputat" (ukr. Member of Parliament) magazine, in Ukrainian language. Terry Davis: Instead of talking about early elections, Ukrainian politicians should concentrate on promises they made
By Tetyana VYSOTSKA
- Mr Secretary General, every time we meet, I ask you for your opinion about the political crisis in Ukraine: last year we were talking about the Ukrainian crisis, as well as the year before. In your opinion, what’s happening in Ukraine now, and what can we, as Ukrainians, do to change the situation for the better?
- I think that sometimes it is a mistake to exaggerate the difficulties. I myself never use the word “crisis” when I’m discussing the political situation in Ukraine. Yes, it is a very difficult political situation, it’s a very complicated political situation, and there are lots of difficulties there. But this is not a crisis in my book. A crisis is something much worse. So, I’m glad that it is not a crisis by my definition. I have seen it suggested by some people that there might be another election…
- Yes, they are talking about next March…
- Well, that is for Ukrainians to decide - whether there should be another election. It’s not my business. But I must say that I find difficult to understand what people think a new election would bring. If there is an election, we must wait for the result…
- But isn’t it too often to have an election every year?
- As I know, in many countries elections took place twice in the course of two years. But there are two reasons why I think this is something to be avoided, if possible. First of all, it distracts attention from the real problems of the country and the real difficulties of the people of Ukraine. Secondly, in every democracy people may say: we don’t want to be voting every year, we elected these people, please, get on and do the job you are elected for. It damages democracy, when people think: the politicians can’t agree, they are just squabbling, fighting among each other, arguing… That actually damages the reputation of politics and democracy. Election is an essential part of democracy, but not every week.
- Is the Council of Europe planning to give some official advice concerning the situation in Ukraine? Are you going to meet with Mr Yushchenko and Ms Tymoshenko again?
- I have visited Ukraine several times during the last two years. I know that some people – people not from Ukraine, but from other countries – think that I should not visit Ukraine too often. They say: you should also visit us. There are several reasons why I take a special interest in Ukraine. It is not only because of the people of Ukraine, for whom I have great respect and affection. I think that Ukraine – like Belarus – has been neglected in the past by people like me from Western Europe. So, I try to compensate that a little bit by giving a lot of attention to Ukraine.
Ukraine is a very big country; it has a lot to offer to the rest of Europe. Also it has a very rich history. I have a lot of sympathy for the people of Ukraine, especially because of that period of 1932-33, which you call Holodomor, when so many people died.
- Ukraine is campaigning now for world recognition of Holodomor.
- It must have been a terrible period. This is not a case of being anti-Russian, it is a historic fact that millions of people did die in Ukraine. If I can just give you another example: I came from the United Kingdom, and our neighbouring country is the Republic of Ireland. In Ireland they still have the memory of the great famine which took place 160 years ago. They still remember it, talk about it. It takes a long time for such events to fade in a memory of the people. In Ukraine this memory is also very live.
That is not to blame people, not a case of who is responsible – this is a very difficult matter to judge history. But I can understand why Ukrainians are still so concerned and so upset about this tragedy.
- That’s why Ukraine asks the Council of Europe and the Parliamentary Assembly to condemn Holodomor as genocide against the Ukrainian nation.- It is a matter for historians to argue, whether it was genocide or not. To me the most important thing is that millions of people died. Personally I pay respect to the people of Ukraine, and I try to encourage Ukrainians of today to build a better future for Ukrainians of tomorrow.
- To do that and to stop – not crisis, but problems – in Ukraine all the main political forces are thinking about a Constitutional reform. But the changes proposed differ from each other completely: from a strong presidential model to a pure parliamentary system. In your opinion, is it the right time for Ukraine to change its Constitution? Which way should we move?
- Of course, this is a matter for Ukraine to decide which system you should adopt. There are advantages and disadvantages in both systems. What I would say, as a friend of Ukraine, is that it would be in the interest of the people of Ukraine for the politicians to settle this issue as quickly as possible.
- Do you think it is possible to find a quick consensus in this situation?
- I think the situation has to be settled. If I were an Ukrainian, I would be more concerned about the school for my children or grandchildren, I’d be more concerned about being able to buy clothes and food for my family, and I’d be more concerned about the house or apartment in which we live. I’d be concerned about the quality of the air we breathe and of the water we drink. These are really important things – it is a standard of living and a quality of life. People are not very interested in whether it is the parliamentary system or the presidential system. What they want is results.
- So, the reform in Ukraine should be done very soon?
- My strong wish is that the politicians of Ukraine should settle this issue in the interest of the people of Ukraine as quickly as possible. And then start discussing, even arguing, about the policies to be followed by the government in terms of schools, hospitals, housing, and the essential things of life. That’s what people want to hear.
- Politicians just have to start to work…
- I think it is very much in the interest of democracy for the debates in Ukraine to move away from a constitution onto the political issues. I don’t know what this policy should be – in a democracy that is for politicians and for the people of Ukraine to decide. Politicians should propose ideas about policy. It’s true that the best way to decide this is an election. But you do not have an election every year...
It’s like a sailing: you have to decide on a course you are going to follow. That does not mean you simply go ahead regardless of the fact that there is an iceberg in front of you. But you should not keep changing course, you should not keep changing a captain of a ship.
- Talking about the captain of the ship, some Ukrainian politicians advise to have an early election not only of the Parliament, but also of the President of Ukraine. Do you think it is a good idea to change everything in one day?
- Well, it’s a matter for Ukraine, not for outsiders. Of course, Ukraine is a very important member of the Council of Europe, but as a Secretary General of the Council of Europe I do not tell Ukrainians what they should do and when they should have an election.
- The next big problem for today’s Ukraine is its aspiration to become a member of NATO. This trend of Ukrainian foreign policy has already worsened our relationship with Russia. What tone of conversation should Kiev choose in dialogue with Moscow, in order not to spoil our bilateral relations, but to move towards NATO membership?
- You have so well educated and experienced diplomats that I do not think Ukraine needs any lessons in this field. But if I were Ukrainian, I would say to Russians: I ask you to think, why we want to join NATO. Russians should think themselves, why does Ukraine want to join NATO, why does Georgia want to join NATO. And I told that to Russians…
- What did they answer?
- They were surprised because they haven’t thought about that.
- What is your opinion on this issue? Should Ukraine join NATO?
- I am not going to express my opinion about whether Ukraine should join NATO for one very good reason: I know that it is a subject of intense political debates in Ukraine. I never get involved in domestic politics. That’s a matter for Ukrainians to decide.
- Moscow has warned Kiev that if Ukraine joins NATO, or Membership Action Plan (MAP), it will apply some serious sanctions. Will you and the Council of Europe get involved if Russia keeps this promise?
- It depends on what these sanctions are. For example, the price of gas is not a matter for the Council of Europe.
- And if it will be the withdrawal of the Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership Agreement with Ukraine?
- I do not know the terms of the Friendship and Cooperation Agreement. One thing I can say is you cannot force someone to be your friend.
- Lets talk about the issue you know very well – it is the election of the Ukrainian judge of the European Court of Human Rights. Why this process is so long? I know that there is some misunderstanding – or something else – between the President of Ukraine, his Secretariat and the Council of Europe. Can you explain what’s happening and what is the future of this issue?
- You are absolutely right – I agree with you – it just takes for too long to settle this issue. When I visited Kiev last time, I had discussions about it, in particular, with people in the Secretariat of the President. Based on these discussions –they were private discussions – I think there was a lot of misunderstanding. I have done my best to clarify the situation and the rules for the Ukrainian authorities. If there is goodwill on their side, this issue should be settled within the next few weeks.
- I hope so. But what if the problem will not be settled? What next?
- What I’m saying about the political difficulties – not crisis, but difficulties – in Ukraine is that they distract attention. They draw attention away from the real problems of the people of Ukraine. There is an argument from Ukrainian authorities that because there is a political tension, they focus on other issues. But the important issue of the election of the judge should be settled – the quicker, the better for the people of Ukraine.
- It seems to me that the monitoring process concerning Ukraine will not be finished in the near future…
- I will be surprised if the monitoring process is finished in the near future. I would like it to finish, but I do not think it will be finished, until Ukraine has made more progress in keeping its promises. So, I repeat: instead of talking about an early election, instead of talking about when you will have presidential elections, instead of talking about getting your judge elected, it would be a very good thing if the politicians of Ukraine concentrated on the outstanding promises which they made on behalf of Ukraine, when it joined the Council of Europe. Then I would celebrate with the people of Ukraine the end of the monitoring process.
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