Tuesday, May 18, 2010
Wednesday, May 12, 2010
Revenge or Justice? Old criminal case re-launched against ex-PM of Ukraine Yulia Tymoshenko.
It is an old, but not very clear story. There is no official information yet on the content of a case, but it is said that the case concerns suspected bribes. I may only say for sure that the criminal case No4912-93 against Mrs. Tymoshenko was opened in May 2004, while she was in a strong opposition to President Leonid Kuchma. Current President Viktor Yanukovych had been serving as a Prime Minister that time.
According to the Prosecutor General’s Office information service, the proceedings were closed in January 2005 – after the Orange Revolution and the inauguration of President Viktor Yushchenko. The planned investigative actions were not completed, PGO press service claims, and the pre-court trial has been re-launched.
Yulia Tymoshenko states that the case No4912-93 was closed in 2004 (e.g. before she came to power). At the today’s press briefing near the office of the PGO Main Investigative Department, she said that the investigation was dismissed due to the absence of crime components. ‘Prosecutor General’s Office is a repressive instrument of Yanukovych”, she argues. “A big shadow project on privatization of state monopolies has been prepared, using the technology of foundation of joint ventures with foreign country. Our political team is the only one which opposes to that”.
The same time some fresh cases have been opened against the team of Yulia Tymoshenko. The Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine Volodymyr Sivkovych has recently informed journalists that investigation of cases on stealing the budgetary funds by the Tymoshenko’s Government is planned to be finished by autumn 2010. By that time “the majority of opposition members will think on how to hide or escape”, he added. The alleged corrupt practices in a budget sphere are estimated to overcome 100 billion UAH (more than 12.5 billion USD).
Meanwhile, on 17-18 May the President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev will visit Ukraine again – to sign more documents, strengthening the ties between two countries. First of all, an agreement on the demarcation of Russia-Ukraine border is to be signed. Let’s see what Ukraine is granting to Russia in this field.
It is interesting to mention that on the day of Medvedev’s arrival to Kiev, Yulia Tymoshenko is invited to the PGO office again. Revenge or justice?
Monday, January 19, 2009
Ukraine-Russia gas transit and supply contracts: Europe will not suffer from gas-cut during next 10 years, gas price for Ukraine still in shadow.
Why I suggested that the gas price for Ukraine will be around $320 per tcm in 2009? My thoughts were based on three things:
1. Ukrainian negotiators were insisting on fixed gas price (I was pleasantly surprised when I’ve heard today that the gas price formula has been worked out for Ukraine).
2. The Prime Minister of Russia Vladimir Putin, President Dmitri Medvedev and the head of Gazprom Alexei Miller were declaring the “European price” for Ukraine at the level of $450 per tcm (last time Mr. Putin told that on Saturday, 17 January).
3. Gazprom has just switched to some “European formula” in his relations with Turkmenistan, and the price of Turkmen gas for Russians in the first quarter of 2009 will be about $300 per tcm.
It seemed logical to assume that the gas price for Ukraine should be at least more than $300. It is really great if the today’s statement of Prime Minister of Ukraine Yulia Tymoshenko is true, and Naftogaz will pay only around $235-250 per tcm. (She also told that the 20% discount will save $5 billion, which is possible when the price is $220). It would be like a miracle, if the average price for Ukraine were $199 as was suggested by the Secretariat of Ukrainian President. But we have to think, why Moscow agreed for such a low price level, as the Gazprom is clearly not a charity foundation, especially at crisis times.
Anyway, it is still difficult to say, how much Ukraine will pay for gas in 2009. There is not much information about the gas supply contract at all. Here is all I know today:
a) Gas supply and gas transit contracts are signed for 10 years;
b) Starting from 2010, the transit fee and the gas price will be calculated on a base of a clear formula (I hope this “Ukrainian formula” does already exist);
c) In 2009 there will be a fixed gas price for Ukraine, based on “average European gas price minus 20%”;
d) Transit fee in 2009 will stay at the level of 2008 – $1.7 per tcm for 100 km;
e) There will be no mediators in gas trade between Ukraine and Russia (but I think it’s early to say good bye to RosUkrEnergo as a player on European gas market).
Yulia Tymoshenko promised to make the new gas price public “in one-two days”, and it seems that the price is not agreed yet, despite of any paper signed. As the Russian TV reported, after signing the documents and press briefing Mrs. Tymoshenko went to the Gazprom office for some extra negotiations.
Talking about the gas price in 2010, I would like to propose a link, which leads to the fresh prognosis of Goldman Sachs Group Inc., forecasting “swift and violent rebound” in energy prices in the second half of the 2009.
Oil prices may have reached their lowest point already, after falling to $32.40 in mid-December, and are expected to rise to $65 by the end of this year, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. commodity analyst Jeffrey Currie said at a conference in London today. A recent tactic of using supertankers to store crude oil to take advantage of higher prices later this year is “difficult” to profit from and is “near the end of this process” anyway, the Goldman analyst said.
New York crude futures for delivery in December, trading near $56 a barrel, currently cost some $15 a barrel more than March futures, a market situation known as contango, where prices are higher for later delivery. The contango is likely to flatten as supply cuts by OPEC and other producers take effect, reducing the availability of oil for immediate delivery, Mr. Currie said.
Sunday, January 11, 2009
High Treason – II. Some conclusions from the Cold War started by Russia-Ukraine gas dispute.
Conclusion 1. The indisputable winner of the Gas Cold War 2009 is Russia and Russian Gazprom.
I would not agree with some observers who say that the image of Russia as a reliable gas supplier and the Gazprom as a relevant business partner suffered a lot. Europe and Europeans may think and feel whatever they want, but it is really impossible to replace more than 160 billion of cubic meters of Russian gas with some alternative source of energy. So, Europe will stay dependent on Russian gas supply, whatever the image of Russia will be.
Actually Russian Gazprom has already received a lot of profits from the Cold War:
1. Gas prises. European consumers were predicting the Russian gas average prices for Europe to fall to around $320 per tcm (thousand cubic metres) in 2009 due to the low oil prices level. New Cold War led to rise of the oil demand in Europe as of the alternative energy resource, and this will prevent the significant fall of gas prices.
2. Alternative pipeline projects. Gazprom currently has two new gas pipelines projects: the Nord Stream pipeline, which runs under the Baltic sea from Russian Vyborg to German Greifswald, and the South Stream, which will cross the Black Sea to Bulgaria and then split in the direction of Austria and Greece. Both pipelines will definitely get bigger support of the European companies, as the alternative for “non-adequate” Ukrainian route. (Though Ukrainian route cannot be eliminated as it transports around 80% of Russian gas export to Europe).
3. Punching Ukraine. Undermining the image of Ukraine and its President Viktor Yushchenko was a “pleasant revenge” of Russia and its top-authorities for Orange Revolution, support of Georgia, and Holodomor festivities. After this crisis nobody (except of some ultra-pro-Ukrainian-idealists) in Europe would think seriously about the possibility for Ukraine to join the EU earlier than in 100 years, and nobody in NATO would seriously consider future Ukrainian full membership in the Alliance.
4. Extra money. The crises appeared to become the real opportunity to rise gas prices for Ukraine and to get extra-profits.
Conclusion 2. The Gas Cold War was artificially organized.
Of course, Ukraine could sign the gas supply agreement with Russia before the New Year and prevent the crisis. Gazprom proposed the price of $250 per tcm, which is acceptable for Ukraine and its economy (in case of proper management of the State Oli and Gas Company Naftogaz Ukraine and fair distribution of up to 18 billion cubic meters of gas the Ukraine is producing by itself every year. The price of $250 is logical: last year Ukraine was paying $179,5 per tcm, and there is an agreement that the price will raise gradually to the European level during three years. It is approximately plus $70-80-90 every year, so, Russians should charge $250 or even more, and it was predictable.
But the gas agreement with Russia was not signed, and the Ukrainian officials who refused to sign the documents were consciously provoking the gas crisis. No agreement – no supplies, even a schoolboy may predict such a situation. Some Naftogaz officials said that the President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko prohibited signing of this agreement. It sounds unconvincing, as at that time nobody, including the Prime Minister of Ukraine Yulia Tymoshenko, made any rough statement on this point. It is also very naïve to think that the Gazprom and Naftogaz Ukraine really have communication problems and cannot reach a deal on gas supply to Ukraine. It’s unbelievable even if we take to the account the fact that the Head of Naftogaz Oleg Dubyna is flying in one plane with his Gazprom counterpart Aleksei Miller.
So, the gas crisis was surely staged by Kremlin and by some high authorities in Ukraine. Viktor Yushchenko is not among them, though he didn’t do anything (he could do a lot) to prevent the Gas Cold War. I would also add that the Head of Naftogaz Ukraine Oleg Dubyna was appointed to his position by the Yulia Tymoshenko’s quota, and that he is in very close relations with the Industrial Union of Donbass business group, which has permanent conflict of interests with “gas trade middleman” Dmytro Firtash who controls half of the “RosUkrEnergo” intermediate company.
Conclusion 3. In frames of Ukrainian domestic politics the gas crisis played not in favour of President Yushchenko.
Everyone might notice that the President of Ukraine was trying not to be involved into the gas crisis from the very start. He was mentioned a lot by all the participants of the negotiations (in positive and negative manner), he made some phone calls to his counterparts in Europe and to Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev, but he was avoiding to get inside the negotiations and discussions by himself. Why? It seems that he has a very vulnerable position, when one is talking about the gas supply question. During his Presidency, Mr. Yushchenko has been accused a lot of times in having some profits from the work of the RosUkrEnergo. In particular some people were accusing Mr. Firtash in paying some bills for Kateryna Chumachenko, the wife of the President. These accusations were never proved, but also never dishonoured, though Viktor Yushchenko could for example appeal to courts. If these accusations were true (even semi-true), Viktor Yushchenko is going to lose one of the main sources of his financial support before the Presidential election. By the way, some of the money may be re-transferred in favour of Mrs. Tymoshenko, if we just hypothetically assume that the Itera Company of Igor Makarov may come back to the big gas-supply scene as some people say.
Conclusion 4. The main loser of the Cold War is Ukraine as a country, its economy, and the State oil and gas company Naftogaz Ukraine (but not the current management of this company).
In the geopolitical sense the image of Ukraine as a country (and as a democratic country in particular) has suffered a lot. The New Cold War has demonstrated that Ukraine is totally unpredictable, since the actions of its authorities and state companies are based on the today’s interests of domestic politics, rather than on long-term programmes or interests of the country. Despite of the declarations about the dedication to the democratic ideals and the European course of current leaders of Ukraine, they showed up as a real threat to Europe, European economy and even to the health of the citizens of the European States.
The State Oil and Gas Company Naftogaz Ukraine is close to bankruptcy today. Though I am sure that with normal management this company may easily become a mail financial supplier of Ukrainian budget. (I was trying to make some calculations earlier, and maybe will publish the results here one day, of course, after careful self-proof-reading).
Conclusion 5. The intermediate gas supply company RosUkrEnergo may seem to be a loser, but is not.
The intermediate company RosUkrEnergo also may be considered as a loser in the New Cold War as it will probably be eliminated from Russia-Ukraine gas trade scheme. But I don’t think this statement is true, taking to the account billions dollars of profit RosUkrEnergo had received during the last four years, operating in the sphere of the re-export of gas from Russia to Ukraine and Europe (Hungary, Romania, Poland and Slovakia) and gas trade inside the domestic market of Ukraine. Half owned by Gazprom, RosUkrEnergo was founded as a temporary source of profits, and now it’s just a time for something new. I will not be surprised if Mr. Firtash would be among founders of a new gas trade company who will operate on European – and Ukrainian – markets in coming years.
Conclusion 6. The Europe, still suffering from lack of gas supply, may be considered as a loser also, and the object of manipulation as well.
Conclusion 7. The Cold War is an evidence of a betrayal of the interests of Ukraine by its highest authorities – President, Prime Minister, and Head of State Oil and Gas Company. Their actions and failure to act as well may be called as a high treason with all the consequences it should cause.
Sunday, November 30, 2008
Orange fresh. Who is responsible for the failure of the Ukrainian democratic breakthrough of 2004?
After the attempt on his life and subsequent events of Maidan, the goodwill of
the world was made available to him. Instead of promises delivered, he was
not interested in the running of the business of the country, only in its
ceremonial leadership with a tone of condescension. The shame is that
these things needed to be done are yet devalued by his other pernicious and ego
led actions. Convinced he is Messiah, he fails to notice no one longer
follows...
No matter whom you support, we are all embarrassed and diminished
by his actions to the PM. His latest protestations for her to
pay the Gazprom debt make him the lap dog of Medvedev at the expense of
every Ukrainian. It is as if he would gladly shout “Fire!" in a crowded
theater hoping someone might trample "the Braided One's" toes without even
momentary consideration of other lives that might be lost in the
stampede.
The problems are huge, the solutions deceptively simple:
direct vote of the citizens for their representative to the VR; equality under
the law and the responsibility for it by elected officials and government
workers; a judiciary that is independent and righteous.
Let me start from the end. I agree that the problems Ukraine is facing today are huge, but the solutions are not as simple as it may seem. Ukraine is in need of deep structural reforms – yes, we have to improve our judicial system, but also we need structural economic reforms, new tax policy, land reform, changes in the model of local budgeting, re-building of a system of social security, new energy strategy, and a lot of other things, which are important and urgent. To accomplish these goals, first of all, we need the Parliament, which is able to work effectively. The experience of the last three years demonstrated that Ukraine will never get such a Parliament, using proportional system of vote – no matter, what kind of party list we would adopt (closed or open).
Ukrainian political parties do not have mass membership. They are built not on the values that have a strong public support, but around the charismatic leaders. “Batkivshchyna” party (and even Block of Yulia Tymoshenko) is nothing without Yulia Tymoshenko; the Party of Regions will break up without Viktor Yanukovych. The election of Viktor Yushchenko as an official leader of “Our Ukraine” is nothing more than an attempt to save the party, which is falling apart. All political system of Ukraine is highly corrupt, and even the essential democratic institutions like the Constitutional Court or Central Electoral Commission are fully packed with main parties’ protégés.
One of the public reasons of switching to the proportional voting system was the idea that it will help to build up a real party system in Ukraine. In fact, it just has led to the paralysing of the lawmaking branch of the state power. To cure that disease we should move back to majority vote – at least to give an opportunity for regional leaders to be present in the Verkhovna Rada, not selling themselves to any party (personality).
Next point I would like to mention concerns the President of Ukraine personally. I do not agree with people making from Viktor Yushchenko a kind of anti-hero, badly treating the country and innocent lady Prime Minister. For example, in the question of Russian Gazprom debt neither he nor she was an independent observer. The current non-transparent scheme of gas supply (and transit) in Ukraine was established after the Orange revolution, and was not changed in times when Yulia Tymoshenko was not a Prime Minister.
I agree that the ideals and promises of the Orange Revolution were ruined to a large extent because of Viktor Yushchenko personal weakness. Standing on Maydan, he declared that “criminals of Kuchma times” will be in prison, but in less than a half of a year he was shaking hands with people, whom he previously publicly called as thieves. In other words, he just failed to be tough with his opponents. The main problem of Viktor Yushchenko was that he talked a lot about the changes, but in fact didn’t change anything essentially. Except of his friends (the current team of Mr. Yushchenko is almost free from his comrades of Maydan times).
I want to believe that Viktor Yushchenko is a good person and a sincere patriot of Ukraine. But he is not good enough as the President. He would be a great leader of a country with well-developed democratic traditions, a country, which is not situated on the edge of geopolitical interests of the world powers. Ukraine is definitely not such a country. To govern Ukraine is a big challenge for every politician.
It’s easy to blame Viktor Yushchenko for political impotence. But let me remind that he wasn’t standing on Maydan alone. All the people leading the Orange Revolution are equally responsible for the weakness of today’s Ukraine. The leaders of the Orange revolution had a lot of nice-sounded slogans, but also a total absence of strategy on future governing. They asked us to shout, “Kuchma go away”, and “Yushchenko, yes!”, but in fact they didn’t even think, what to do after Leonid Kuchma would really go away. For almost four years the Orange leaders haven’t worked out a clear step-by-step plan on how to make Ukraine prosperous and democratic. They go on thinking how to get rid of each other. That’s the main problem of contemporary Ukraine. We are in terrible need of new fresh leaders who will end the deadlock. But there are no sigh of such a new movements. Just show me that growing-up centre of progress in Ukraine, and I will join this team.
Sunday, November 23, 2008
What’s up, Ukraine? (15-22 November 2008)
On 22 November Ukraine marked the anniversary of the start of a Soviet-era artificially organised famine – Holodomor – that killed millions of people in Ukraine, Russia and Kazakhstan in 1932-33. The terrible cruel famine had a goal to force peasants to join collective farms. As a "breadbasket" of the Soviet Union, Ukraine suffered the most. Holodomor killed from 3 to 10 million of people. "This was not death through hunger – this was murder of people through hunger," the President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko said in his speech. Among the guests at the event were President of Poland Lech Kaczynski, President of Latvia Valdis Zatlers, President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus, President of Georgia Mikhail Saakashvili, speakers of foreign parliaments, representatives of international organizations, foreign state officials, and diplomats.
Parliamentary holidays. The Parliament of Ukraine (Verkhovna Rada) decided to make a break until the 2nd of December.
On 20 November Ukrainian MP’s were supposed to elect new Speaker, following the dismissal of Arseniy Yatseniuk. But that didn’t happen. Instead, the plenary was closed and a new one was scheduled on 2 December.
“Topping” for crisis. The price of Russian gas for Ukraine may be more than $400 per 1,000 cubic meters.
Ukraine received an answer from the Russian authorities for non-friendly statements and media interviews. The President of Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev said that if Ukraine does not repays the $ 2.4 billion debt, direct gas supplies to Ukraine will be cut off. The Head of Russian gas monopoly Gasprom Alexei Miller added also that the price for natural gas for Ukraine may rise from the current $179.5 per 1,000 cubic meters to over $400.
Naftogas Ukraine (“Oil and Gas of Ukraine”) company rejected the mentioned amount of debt, and said in a statement on Friday there is actually $1.267 billion of debt, but it is owed not to Gazprom, but to an intermediary company RosUkrEnergo. “Naftogaz Ukrainy points out that in 2008, the only supplier of natural gas imported to Ukraine is RosUkrEnergo Company,” press service of Naftogas Ukraine informs.
Prime Minister of Ukraine Yulia Tymoshenko previously declared that Ukraine had reached an agreement with Russian Federation to switch to market gas prices step by step during next three years. The Head of Naftogas Ukraine Oleg Dubyna predicted that the gas price for Ukraine will not grow more than to $250-300 for 1,000 cubic meters.
The President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko has immediately accused Tymoshenko in “irresponsible actions” that permitted the accumulation of the debt. “I want to warn that such practice leads to colonization of Ukraine,” he declared at the country’s Security Council meeting on 21 November. One should fight corruption in the gas sphere, and move to transparent contracts, not to transfer all the responsibility to Government”, answered Yulia Tymoshenko the same day, being with official visit in Sweden.
The ghost from Kiev. Viktor Yanukovych visited Moscow.
The Party of Regions has almost ruined a years of work of its PR officers to eliminate the party's strictly pro-Russian image on the West. On 20 November the Head of the Party Viktor Yanukovych visited Moscow to take part in the 10th Congress of the United Russia party and to meet the Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
Thursday, November 20, 2008
Ukraine is playing with anti-Russian rhetoric
Among all the articles the real “must read” is the one in ‘El Pais’ named “Ucrania quiere garantías para no perder de nuevo su independencia” (“Ukraine wants the guarantees not to loose its independence”). Mr. Yushchenko told journalists that Ukraine needed to become a member of the North-Atlantic Alliance not to loose its independence. The most impressive – as for me – quotation of Viktor Yushchenko from this text concerns the letter of Dmitry Medvedev, mentioned in this blog: “The President of Russia humiliated millions of people who rest in peace, killed innocent people who had not done anything wrong to anyone”. (In the original: “El presidente de Rusia humilla a millones de personas que hoy descansan en paz, inocentes asesinados que no debían nada a nadie”).
The idea that the NATO may save Ukrainian independence from the Northern neighbour was quoted also in ‘The Times’. In article titled “Don’t turn deaf ear to Ukraine Nato bid, Viktor Yushchenko begs allies” the President “gave warning that expansion of the military alliance was vital to European security in the wake of Russia’s war with Georgia, and the only way to secure Ukraine’s independence”.
I’m just wondering why Mr. Yushchenko is so straight in his words. He may not like Dmitry Medvedev or Vladimir Putin, or all Russia as a whole phenomenon, but why he’s showing that on public?
To be pro-Ukrainian doesn’t mean to be anti-Russian. It is a mistake to demonstrate your national consciousness through international conflict. It’s twice big mistake if a half (if not more) of the population of your country speaks Russian at home. (Just for information: I speak Ukrainian). And it’s a three times big mistake, if you are provoking conflict with your neighbour who sells you gas, and whose businessmen own almost all oil refineries in your country. Ukraine is really playing with fire.
You may read full ‘El Pais’ article here, and ‘The Times’ here.
Wednesday, November 19, 2008
Presidential Absenteeism. Following Dmitry Medvedev, foreign Presidents keep refusing to attend Ukrainian Holodomor anniversary
The International Forum “My Nation Will Live Forever” dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the 1932 - 1933 Great Famine (Holodomor) in Ukraine will take place in Kyiv on 22 November. It will be a huge event, with thousands of estimated guests from all over the world. As was previously announced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, the Presidents of seven countries, namely Macedonia, Estonia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Georgia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, confirmed their participation in the Forum. The participation of another 5 foreign delegations headed by Presidents was being discussed. The President’s press secretary Iryna Vannykova also said “the representatives of around 40 countries who were personally invited by Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, will come to Ukraine”.But the situation has been changing. More and more of high guests are refusing to visit Kyiv this week. Some Presidents, who previously accepted the invitation, have recently decided not to go.
The first President who publicly announced that he would not be present at the anniversary, was the President of Russian Federation Dmitriy Medvedev. He even wrote to President Yushchenko a rather critical letter to explain his point of view on a subject. (Some quotations and link to the English translation of the letter you may find here). The Presidents of Azerbaijan, Macedonia and Montenegro had cancelled their visits also.
Director of the Foreign Ministry's department for cultural cooperation Mykhailo Skurativskyi informed journalists today that the Presidents of three countries – Poland, Georgia, and Latvia – will surely attend International Forum. The confirmation from the President of Lithuania is expected soon. “A total of 25 official delegations had confirmed their participation in the forum”, Mr. Skurativskyi told. “The delegations will be mostly led by parliament speakers, vice speakers, and ministers”.
Wednesday, May 7, 2008
Enthronement
Today, on 7 May 2008, Dmitri Medvedev took office as the third President of Russia. The half-of-an-hour inauguration ceremony which took place in Great Kremlin Palace’s throne hall was very interesting to watch and rather useful for future thoughts about the new "first face" of Russian politics. Of course, such events are planned in advance so thoroughly that one should not expect any surprise or clear sign of something. Nevertheless we can make some conclusions.The first conclusion: it is a big mistake to call Mr. Medvedev a “puppet president” (as, for example, Tony Halpin from The Times did in a recent article). Yes, the appointment (through the well organized elections) of Dmitri Medvedev as a President was grounded on decision of Vladimir Putin. But it is obvious that Mr. Putin hasn’t made that decision alone. We shouldn’t forget about the circumstances of Putin’s intronisation which took place 8 years ago. We shouldn’t forget about so called “Family” which still sharply controls Russian big economy and politics. So, the issue is much more complex than we can think "from the first sight".
I was watching the inauguration procedure on TV, sitting in cafe of one of the administrative buildings of the Parliament of Ukraine (Verkhovna Rada). The performance was really impressive.
…Immense mechanism of the Kremlin’s chiming clock started to count seconds left to 12 o’clock of Moscow time. With the loud accompaniment of clock bells future President of Russian Federation appeared in the gold-decorated hall, overcrowded with cream of the cream of Russian economy and political elite.
“Look, Russia has become a real empire. Medvedev will be like a Tsar of Russia”, - commented a woman-official with a cap of coffee, - Nobody can predict, what kind of President he is going to be. But I’m sure – he is not shy, he will show up brightly”. Her friend who prefers tea added with a bit of jealousy: “Today is a holiday for all the Russians, even government officials don’t work”.
Mr. Medvedev can not be described as a tall men. Actually his height is only 162 cm. But everyone who was observing the ceremony noticed that he didn’t look as not tall enough for the post of the President of Russia. Some features of the conduct of Dmitri Medvedev during the inauguration ceremony have shown that he is not going to stay a weak President as some well-known people want him to be.
Today Dmitri Medvedev is not pretending to dominate Vladimir Putin. But after the moment of exchange of a high status something changed – almost invisibly – in the relations between two Presidents, former and present. Dmitri Medvedev has not pretending to dominate, but he started to dominate, though in some little moments. For example, during the parade of the Presidential regiment it was not Dmitri Medvedev who started the conversation with his friend Vladimir Putin: the new President took a pause, while the old one couldn't.
42 years old Dmitri Medvedev is surely not a puppet president. He is rather a dark horse, a joker in the pack who can be easily transformed to any type of the Head of State. It seems to me that he will soon become a new authoritarian President of Russia – like Putin, but with different style.

